Gallagher v. Best Western Cottontree Inn Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 43695 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
4-26-2016
Gallagher v. Best Western Cottontree Inn
Respondent's Brief Dckt. 43695
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Gallagher v. Best Western Cottontree Inn Respondent's Brief Dckt. 43695" (2016). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 6128.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/6128
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
GERALYN GALLAGHER, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
vs. 
BEST WESTERN COTTONTREE INN, 
SNAKE RlVER PETERSEN 
PROPERTIES, LLC, A WYOMING 
CLOSE LIMITED LIABILITY, and 
DOES 1 through 10 inclusively, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Supreme Court 
Docket No. 43695 
Bonneville County 
Court Case No. CV-2014-3826 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bonneville 
Honorable Judge Alan C. Stephens, Presiding 
I 
Allen H. Browning, Esq. 
BROWNING LAW 
482 Constitution Way, Ste. 111 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Telephone: (208) 542-2700 
: Facsimile: (208) 542-2711 
Attorneys for PlaintifJ!Appellant 
Geralyn Gallagher 
Michael W. Moore 
Steven R. Kraft 
MOORE & ELIA, LLP 
P.O. Box 6756 
I ~~/;;i1~~:~~;ti)0i36-69oo 
Facsimile: (208) 3 36-7031 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent 
Snake River Petersen Properties, LLC 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..................................................................... 1 
A. Nature of the Case and Background ........................................................ 1 
B. Course of Proceedings Below ................................................................. .2 
C. Statement of Material Facts ................................................................... 3 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. ........................................... 5 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW ............................................................................ 5 
IV. ARGUMENT ......................................................................................... 6 
A. Geralyn Gallagher's Amended Complaint naming Snake River does not 
relate back to the time of the filing of her original 
Complaint ............................................................................................ 6 
B. Snake River's Failure to file a certificate of assmned business name with the Idaho 
Secretary of State's Office does not toll the two-year statute of 
limitations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................................................................. 9 
V. CONCLUSION .................................................................................... 16 
1 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES: 
Boise Tower Assocs., LLC v. Hogland, 147 Idaho 774,779,215 P.3d 494,499 (2009) ............. 5 
Chacon v. Sperry Corp, 111 Idaho 270, 723 P.2d 814 (1986) .. _ ..... -- ...................... 9 
Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851,852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 1986) ........... 6 
G&M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514,517,808 P.2d 851,854 (1991) .............. 5 
Hoopes v. Deere & Co., 117 Idaho 386, 788 P.2d 201 (Idaho 1990) .................................... 7 
Ketterling v. Burger King Corp., 152 Idaho 555, 272 P.3d 527 (2012) ................................ 9 
McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 769, 820 P.2d 360, 364 (1991 ) ........................................ 5 
Noreen v. Price Dev. Co. Ltd. P 'ship, 135 Idaho 816, 25 P.3d 129 (Ct.App. 2001 ) .................. 8 
Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 106 S.Ct. 2379, 91 L.Ed.2d 18 (1986) ............................ 9 
fVait v. Leavell Cattle, Inc., 136 Idaho 792, 41 P.3d 220 (2001) ......................................... 7 
Winn v. Campbell, 145 Idaho 727, 729-730 (Idaho 2008) ................................................. 6 
OTHER AUTHORITIES: 
Idaho Code §5-219 .............................................................................................. 6 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 4(a)(2) ..................................................................... .4 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15( c) .............................................................. 1,2,6, 7,8,9 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) ........................................................................ 5 
11 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
Nature of the Case and Background. 
This case concerns a slip and fall accident that occuned at the Best Western Cottontree 
Inn, located at 900 Lindsay Boulevard in Idaho Falls, Idaho, on July 10, 2012. Geralyn Gallagher 
filed her lawsuit on July 9, 2014. Prior to filing her lawsuit, Ms. Gallagher's only attempt to 
ascertain the owner of the subject hotel was a search of on the Idaho Secretary of State's website. 
Relying solely on the Secretary of State's online information, the lawsuit originally named the 
wrong defendant, the previous owner of the hotel, L & L Legacy Limited Partnership ("L & L 
Legacy"). 
Approximately two years and nine months after the accident, Ms. Gallagher amended her 
Complaint to name Snake River Petersen Properties, LLC ("Snake River"), the owner of the 
hotel at the time of the accident, as a defendant. Service of the Amended Complaint, nine months 
after the two-year statute of limitations had expired, was the first notice Snake River had of the 
claim or the lawsuit. Consequently, the Amended Complaint served to Snake River does not 
relate back to the filing of the original Complaint pursuant to I.R.C.P. 15(c). 
Ms. Gallagher asserts that the Amended Complaint, served nine months too late, should 
relate back, and that the limitations period should be tolled because of her "reliance" upon the 
information found on the Idaho Secretary of State's website. However, applying the plain 
language of I.R.C.P. 15(c), the District Court dismissed Ms. Gallagher's Amended Complaint as 
not relating back because Snake River was served nine months after the statute of limitations had 
run. It also conectly concluded that Idaho law requires a plaintiff to do more to discover the 
proper party than a simple search of the Secretary of State's website. There is no justification for 
tolling the statute of limitations in this case. 
B. Course of Proceedings Below. 
On July 9, 2014, Ms. Gallagher filed a Verified Complaint for Damages and Demand for 
Jury Trial against Best \Vestem Cottontree Inn and L & L Legacy. (R. pp. 6-10). In December of 
2014, Ms. Gallagher attempted to serve the Idaho registered agent for L & L Legacy, attorney 
Scott Eskelson, who refused service and informed Plaintiff that the business had been sold. (R. 
pp. 10-14). Weeks later, on January 8, 2015, Ms. Gallagher filed a Motion to Extend Time for 
Service of Plaintiffs Complaint and Summons and Affidavit of Allen H. Browning. (R. pp. 10-
14 ). On January 14, 2015, the Court entered an Order to Extend Time for Service ninety days, 
until April 14, 2015. (R. pp. 19-20). Ms. Gallagher's Amended Complaint and Summons was 
filed by Plaintiff on April 9, 2015 and served upon Best Western Cottontree Inn and Snake River 
on April 13, 2015. (R. pp. 23-27, 35). Snake River filed a Notice of Appearance on April 27, 
2015 (R. p. 2). The parties filed a Stipulation for Dismissal of L & L Legacy on May 19, 2015. 
(R. pp. 38-39). On June 4, 2015, the Court entered an Order for Dismissal of L & L Legacy 
Partnership, LLC With Prejudice. (R. p. 59). 
On May 21, 2015, Snake River filed a Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support 
that requested dismissal based on Ms. Gallagher's untimely service and because Plaintiffs 
Amended Complaint did not relate back to the original filing date pursuant to I.R.C.P. 15(c). (R. 
pp. 46-55). On June 5, 2015, Ms. Gallagher filed an objection to Snake River's motion. Snake 
River filed its Reply Brief on June 19, 2015. (R. pp. 61-78). Following oral argument on June 23, 
the Court granted Snake River's motion and dismissed Snake River with prejudice. (R pp. 79-
87). Ms. Gallagher filed a Motion to Reconsider on July 10, 2015. (R. pp. 88-89). Ms. Gallagher 
filed no brief in support of the motion. (R. pp. 93-98). Snake River filed its Opposition to Ms. 
Gallagher's Motion to Reconsider on August 31, 2015. (R. pp. 90-92). The Court held a hearing 
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on Ms. Gallagher's Motion to Reconsider on September 8, 2015. Following oral argument, the 
Court allowed Snake River time for additional briefing before issuing a ruling because Ms. 
Gallagher had failed to file a brief outlining the arguments she later presented at oral argument. 
Snake River's supplemental brief opposing Ms. Gallagher's Motion for Reconsideration was 
filed September 15, 2015. (R. pp. 93-98). Ms. Gallagher "responded" to Snake River's 
Supplemental Brief on September 21, 2015. Snake River/Best Western filed a reply to Plaintiff's 
Opposition to Defendant's Supplemental Brief on September 24, 2015. (R. pp. 99-107). On 
September 28, 2015, the Court entered its Decision and Order, denying Ms. Gallagher's Motion 
to Reconsider. Ms. Gallagher appealed. 
C. Statement of Material Facts. 
This case concerns a slip and fall accident that occurred at the Best Western Cottontree 
Inn, located at 900 Lindsay Boulevard in Idaho Falls, Idaho, on July 10, 2012. (R. p. 24). 
Geralyn Gallagher hired Allen Browning to pursue her injury claim. 
On July 9, 2014, one day before the two-year statute of limitations expired, Ms. 
Gallagher filed a lawsuit alleging that she fell on a wet floor located in the Best Western 
Cottontree Inn in Idaho Falls on July 10, 2012. (R. p. 7). The Complaint named Best Western 
Cottontree Inn and L & L Legacy, the alleged owner and operator of the hotel, as defendants. (R. 
p. 6). 
Prior to filing the lawsuit, Ms. Gallagher's only attempt to ascertain the owner of the 
subject hotel was a search on the Idaho Secretary of State website. (R. pp. 13-18). The Complaint 
relied entirely upon the Secretary of State's online information, which provided no address or 
location for the hotel. (R. p. 6-9, 13-18). Due to Ms. Gallagher's failure to reasonably investigate 
the identity of the owner, her Complaint named the wrong defendant. (R. pp. 6-9, 13-18). 
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December of 201 near the end of the six-month service deadline, Ms. Gallagher 
attempted to serve the Idaho registered agent for L & L Legacy, attorney Scott Eskelson, but he 
refused to accept service. (R. p. 11). Ms. Gallagher's agent was told by Scott Eskelson at that 
time that Snake River was the owner of the hotel and that James Spatig was the registered agent 
for Snake River (R.p. 14). On January 8, 2015, one dav before the six-month time limit for 
service under I.R.C.P. 4(a)(2) expired, Ms. Gallagher filed a Motion to Extend Time for Service 
of Plaintiffs Complaint and Summons. (R. p. 11-12). The alleged basis for the motion was that 
when Ms. Gallagher attempted to serve the registered agent for L&L Legacy, she was informed 
that the business had been sold. Ms. Gallagher asserted that she needed more time to research 
who owned the business and the property at the time of the incident. (R. p. 11 ). However, 
Plaintiff admits to being previously told by Scott Eskelson in December 2014 that Snake River 
owned the hotel and that the registered agent was James Spatig. (R.p.14). At that time, two and a 
half years had passed since the subject accident. 
The Affidavit of Counsel in support of the motion represented that an attempt to serve L 
& L Legacy's agent was unsuccessful because the Best Western Cottontree Inn was no longer 
owned by L & L Legacy. (R. p. 14). The Affidavit of Counsel also admitted that efforts to locate 
the owner of the Best Western Cottontree Inn had consisted only of a web search of the Idaho 
Secretary of State's webpage. (R. pp. 13-18). On January 14, 2015, the Court granted Plaintiff a 
90-day extension for service. (R. p. 19). 
On April 9, 2015, five days before the 90-day extension expired, and two years and nine 
months after the date of the subject accident, Plaintiffs Amended Complaint and Summons 
were, for the first time, filed and served upon Snake River, the owner and operator of the subject 
Best Western Cottontree Inn. (R. pp. 21-22). Plaintiffs Amended Complaint correctly alleged 
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that at all relevant times, Snake River was the O\\;Tier and operator of the Best Western Cottontree 
Inn, and the owner of the property upon which the hotel is located, in Idaho Falls. (R. pp. 23-24). 
On May 19, 2015, the parties stipulated to dismiss L & L Legacy from the lawsuit as it 
had been sufficiently demonstrated that Snake River had purchased the hotel prior to Ms. 
Gallagher's accident. (R. pp. 38-39). 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. 
A. Geralyn Gallagher's Amended Complaint naming Snake River does not relate back to 
the time of the filing of the original Complaint. 
B. Snake River's failure to file a certificate of assumed business name with the Idaho 
Secretary of State's Office does not toll the two-year statute of limitations. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
When the Idaho Supreme Court reviews a grant of summary judgment, it does so under 
the same standard employed by the District Court. Boise Tower Assocs., LLC v. Hogland, 147 
Idaho 774, 779, 215 P.3d 494, 499 (2009). Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
oflaw." Id. (quoting Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c)). 
When a motion for summary judgment has been properly supported with evidence 
indicating the absence of material fact issues, the opposing party's case must not rest on mere 
speculation, and a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact. 
McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 769, 820 P.2d 360, 364 (1991); G&M Farms v. Funk Irrigation 
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119 Idaho 514,517, 808 P.2d 851,854 (1991). The question is whether a genuine of 
fact exists and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Edwards v. 
Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851,852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 1986). If the undisputed 
facts before the court indicate that summary judgment is appropriate, judgment should be entered 
as a matter oflaw. Id. 
IV. ARGUMENT. 
A. Geralyn Gallagher's Amended Complaint naming Snake River does not relate 
back to the time of the filing of her original Complaint. 
Geralyn Gallagher amended her Complaint to name Snake River as the owner and 
operator of the subject Best Western nine months after the two-year personal injury statute of 
limitations1 had expired on July 10, 2014. Consequently, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) 
governs the outcome in this issue. The pertinent provisions of LC.RP. 15(c) provide as follows: 
An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back 
if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period provided by law for 
commencing the action against the party, the party to be brought in by amendment 
(1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not 
be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have 
known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the 
action would have been brought against the paiiy. 
LR.C.P. 15(c). (Emphasis added.) 
In Winn v. Campbell, 145 Idaho 727, 729-730 (Idaho 2008), this Court decided an issue 
nearly identical to the one presented in this case: 
Winn filed her complaint against Wayne Campbell, dba Home Hotel and 
Motel. However, the location where Winn fell was not the Home Hotel; instead, it 
was the Tumbling Waters Motel. Both hotels, although owned by separate parties, 
are operated by Campbell, Inc., not by Wayne Campbell personally. Winn does 
not dispute that she filed her original complaint against the wrong party. Instead, 
1 This is a claim for personal injuries. The statute of limitations for personal injury is two years. LC. § 5-219. 
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she alleges that the District Court interpreted the relation-back 
and that justice demands she be allowed to amend her complaint. 
too narrowly, 
At issue is Idaho R. Civ. P. 15(c), the relation-back rule. This Court has 
described the rule as follows: [A]n amendment changing the party against whom a 
claim is asserted will relate back to the date of the original pleading if: (a) the 
claim arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set fo1ih or attempted to 
be set forth in the original pleading; (b) within the period provided by law for 
commencing the action against the new partv, he received such notice of the 
institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on 
the merits; and ( c) within the period provided by law for commencing the action 
against the new party, he knew or should have known that the action would have 
been brought against him, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper 
party. Wait v. Leavell Cattle, Inc., 136 Idaho 792, 794-95, 41 P.3d 220, 222-23 
(2001 ). Winn contends that the District Court gave a strict and narrow reading to 
the rule that would require an "absolute finding of 'undue prejudice to the 
opposing party by virtue of the allowance of the amendment' every time the party 
to be included was not notified of the actual filing of the Complaint within the 
applicable statutory limitation period." Winn's argument, however, is without 
merit. 
The issue in Wait was whether the defendant received notice within the 
period provided by law for commencing the action. In a situation similar to the 
one at bar, the plaintiff failed to name the correct party in her complaint, naming 
instead a corporation with a name similar to that of the correct party. The plaintiff 
argued that the period provided by law for commencing an action included the 
six-month period within which a summons must be served after a complaint is 
filed. Id. at 795, 41 P.3d at 223. The Court disagreed. It held, "The phrase 'within 
the period provided by law for commencing the action' means before the 
expiration of the applicable statute of limitations." Id. ( citing Hoopes v. Deere & 
Co., 117 Idaho 386, 788 P.2d 201 (1990)). The Court explained that Hoopes 
"expressly rejected" the argument that "the period provided by law for 
commencing the action" meant the time within which the summons and complaint 
must be served. Id. The Court stated plainly that a civil action is commenced by 
the filing of a complaint-not by service of process. Thus, the Court held that the 
plaintiffs amended complaint did not avoid the statute of limitations because it 
could not relate back to the original filing. 
Winn offers no reason why the plain language of the rule should not apply 
in her case. Instead, she argues that Campbell, Inc. was not prejudiced by her 
failure to name it as a party in a timely manner. The district court held that Rule 
15(c) does not mandate that Campbell, Inc. demonstrate prejudice. Instead, it 
focused on the fact that Winn failed to give notice to the proper party within the 
statutory limitations period. The court noted that Campbell, Inc. received notice of 
the institution of the lawsuit on July 10, 2006, nearly six months after the statute 
of limitations had expired. Further, the court held that failure to provide notice is 
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sufficient to show that the party would be prejudiced in maintaining its defense. 
Since we review this issue under an abuse of discretion standard, the fact that the 
district court wrote a reasoned opinion on the issue is sufficient for us to uphold 
its decision. Furthermore, this is the correct result. 
Wim1 failed to make a proper investigation of whom to sue. Her fall 
occurred at the Tumbling Waters Motel, not the Home Hotel. Had Winn bothered 
to determine where she was actually staying or to find out who operated the 
Tumbling Waters Motel in 2004, she likely could have discovered the proper 
party to sue. Instead, her attorney acted on information from prior dealings he had 
with Campbell and the Tumbling Waters Motel and a brief conversation he had 
with Campbell in the beginning of 2006. However, the record does not show that 
Campbell, Inc. received notice of the suit before the statute of limitations expired. 
In Noreen v. Price Dev. Co. Ltd. P'ship, 135 Idaho 816, 25 P.3d 129 
(Ct.App.2001), the Court of Appeals held that a complaint could not relate back 
where service occurred only one day after the statute of limitations had run. Id. at 
819, 25 P.3d at 132. Here, Winn failed to provide notice to Campbell personally 
until nearly six months after the statute of limitations ran. Even if notice to 
Campbell in his personal capacity was sufficient to satisfy the notice requirements 
for Campbell, Inc., the fact remains that Campbell, Inc. did not receive notice of 
the lawsuit within the limitations period. Thus, Winn's amendment could not have 
related back and the district court properly denied the motion to amend. 
Id. (Emphasis added.) 
The same result was reached by the District Court in our case and should now be 
affirmed by this Court. Ms. Gallagher filed her suit against the wrong party. It is apparent that, as 
in Winn, Ms. Gallagher failed to make a reasonable and proper investigation of whom to sue. 
The correct party, Snake River, the owner and operator of Best \Vestem Cottontree Inn in Idaho 
Falls, did not receive notice of the claim or suit until April 9, 2015, nine months after the statute 
of limitations had expired on July 10, 2014, and two years and nine months after the subject 
accident. Because Snake River did not receive notice of the lawsuit before the statute of 
limitations expired, under I.R.C.P. 15(c), the result must be that the amendment does not relate 
back, and the lawsuit is barred by the two-year personal injury statute of limitations. 
In Hoopes v. Deere & Co., 117 Idaho 386,389 (Idaho 1990), this Court stated: 
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Consequently, Schiavone2 and Chacon3 show that, under amended Rule 
15( c ), the newly named party must receive notice of the commencement of the 
action before the statute of limitations runs. This applies where the defendant's 
name is corrected as well as where the defendant's identity is not initially known. 
(Emphasis added.) 
There is no dispute on the material facts in this case. Snake River did not receive notice 
of Ms. Gallagher's lawsuit before the two-year statute oflimitations expired on July 10, 2014. In 
fact, Snake River did not receive notice until nine months after the statute of limitations had 
expired. The Amended Complaint naming Snake River, the owner and operator of the Best 
Western, as a defendant does not relate back and is barred by the two-year personal injury statute 
of limitations. 
B. Snake River's failure to file a certificate of assumed business name with the 
Idaho Secretary of State's office does not toll the two-year statute of limitations. 
Ms. Gallagher argues that the statute of limitations controversy in this case centers on the 
legal effect of the prior owner, L & L Limited Legacy, remaining listed as the business owner 
with the Idaho Secretary of State. (R. p. 65). While, in dicta, the Winn Court acknowledged the 
possibility of tolling a statute of limitations under circumstances the Court had not yet 
encountered, Winn and then Ketterling v. Burger King Corp., 152 Idaho 555, 272 P.3d 527 
(2012), decided four years after Winn, make it clear that the first step in the analysis is to 
determine whether a plaintiff used reasonable diligence in ascertaining the correct party to sue. 4 
See Winn, 145 Idaho at 731; Ketterling, 152 Idaho at 560. The level of due diligence required by 
a plaintiff to ascertain a business owner, as outlined in Winn, is further analyzed in Ketterling. 
2 Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 106 S.Ct. 2379, 91 L.Ed.2d 18 (1986). 
3 Chacon v. Sperry Corp., 111 Idaho 270, 723 P.2d 814 (1986). 
4 Although Winn acknowledges that there is "some indication that tolling of the statute is possible," the Idaho Court 
of Appeals found otherwise, stating that '"[t]he only remedies or consequences of noncompliance prescribed in the 
Act itself are those provided in§ 53-509.' Noreen v. Price Dev. Co. ?'ship, 135 Idaho 816,821, 25 P.3d 129, 134 
(Ct. App. 2001). Further, it held that '[t]olling of the statute of limitation on a claim against a noncomplying 
business is not a remedy provided by the legislation."' Winn, 145 Idaho at 731 citing Noreen v. Price Dev. Co. 
P'ship, 135 Idaho 816,820, 25 P.3d 129, 133 (Ct. App. 2001). 
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In Ketterling, a customer brought a negligence action against Burger King for injuries 
sustained when she slipped on snow in a restaurant parking lot. 152 Idaho at 556. The plaintiff 
originally filed the lawsuit against Burger King Corporation within the two-year limitations 
period. Id. The plaintiff had searched the Idaho Secretary of State's records for the owner, but 
because the franchisee never filed a certificate of assumed business name, the entity listed on the 
website was Burger King Corporation. Id. at 559. At that point, the plaintiff discontinued her 
search for the business owner. Id. After the limitations period expired, the plaintiff learned the 
identity of the franchisee and amended her complaint to include the franchisee. Id at 556. This 
Court affirmed the District Court's finding that the amended complaint did not relate back 
because the franchisee was not provided with notice of the lawsuit until over a month after the 
period provided by law for commencing the action had expired. Id. at 558. (Emphasis added.) 
This Court also affinned the District Court's refusal to toll the limitations period for the 
franchisee's failure to register an assumed business name for the restaurant. Id. at 560. The 
plaintiff in Ketterling attempted to differentiate her situation from that of Winn, stating that she 
had done her due diligence by checking with the Idaho Secretary of State, but this Court 
disagreed, stating: 
Ketterling is correct that this is not a situation in which she 
"fail[ ed] to take the simple step of finding out where she fell." 
Ketterling had the right place, but she still failed to exercise 
reasonable diligence in figuring out who to sue. Ketterling's search 
of the Secretary of State's records was reasonable, but she clearly 
could have done more. There is no indication in the record that 
she visited the restaurant prior to the end of the limitations period 
to find out who was responsible for operation of the establishment. 
Like the situation in a criminal investigation, where some of the 
best clues are found at the scene of the crime, often evidence 
relevant to a personal injury action can be found at the scene of the 
accident. 
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Ketterling, 152 Idaho at 560. (Emphasis added.) addition to visiting the restaurant to 
detennine who was responsible for its operation, this Court suggested another method the 
plaintiff should have pursued to determine the identity of the business oVvner, stating: 
First, Ketterling could have visited the restaurant before the statute 
of limitations ran and simply asked an employee who was 
responsible for operating the restaurant ... Second, she could have 
contacted the health district to learn the identity of the restaurant 
operator. There is no indication in the record that she did so. 
Therefore, the district court was correct in concluding that the 
identity and contact infonnation for [franchisee] was reasonably 
available and ascertainable prior to the filing of the original 
complaint. 
Id. at 560-61. (Emphasis added.) 
In this case, the undisputed record established by Ms. Gallagher illustrates that the only 
effort she undertook to locate the OVvner of the Best Western Cottontree Inn was a simple search 
of the Idaho Secretary of State's webpage. (R. pp. 13-18). Ms. Gallagher does not state when that 
web search occurred and/or explain why no further action was undertaken to determine the 
owner/operator of the hotel and/or real property on which the hotel is located. As Idaho courts 
have clearly stated, simply performing a search of the Secretary of State's database to determine 
a defendant/party is inadequate, there must be a more comprehensive investigation. For example, 
oftentimes a defendant business will lease property from another entity. In such a situation, a 
mere search of the Secretary of State business filings would not provide a plaintiff with all 
necessary potential defendant/parties, such as the landoVv'ller. 
A reasonable search was not undertaken in this case. Despite living and working in Idaho 
Falls, the location of the accident, Ms. Gallagher did not even visit the Best Western during the 
two years following the accident to simply inquire as to who owned the business and/or property. 
Further, in Ketterling, this Court noted that it is "common knowledge among the public" that in 
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to operate a a from the health department is required, and that plaintiff 
could have determined the owner by contacting the health department. Id. at 560. Similarly, for 
our purposes, it is also common knowledge that ownership of all properties within a county's 
borders are recorded with the county assessor's and/or recorder's office. Yet, Ms. Gallagher 
makes no representations that she called or visited the Bonneville County Assessor's and/or 
Recorder's Office to determine the owner of the subject property. As similarly explained in 
Ketterling, the identity and contact information for the owner/operator of the Best Western 
Cottontree Inn was reasonably available and ascertainable, and Ms. Gallagher's single attempt to 
discover such information via a web search falls short of the level of due diligence required by 
Idaho courts. 
Ms. Gallagher asserts that this Court's decision in Ketterling does not apply to this case 
because of a several alleged factual distinctions. Ms. Gallagher takes the liberty of attempting to 
distinguish the cases based on alleged facts that do not exist in Ketterling. First, she contends 
that the significant difference between the Ketterling case and this case is that, in Ketterling, "the 
Defendant had not filed [ with the Secretary of State], [so] there was no assumed name of record 
which would have confused the plaintiff, and the plaintiff did not inquire further."5 Appellant's 
Brief, p. 10. Conversely, Ms. Gallagher asserts that she searched the Idaho Secretary of State's 
website and found information indicating that L & L Legacy Limited Partnership owned and 
operated the Best Western hotel. However, in Ketterling, this Court's decision states, "Ketterling 
was unable to ascertain the name of any entity, besides Burger King Corporation, registered with 
the Secretary of State to conduct business under the name 'Burger King."' 152 Idaho at 559. This 
does not mean that there was no filing whatsoever, as Ms. Gallagher asserts. Rather, the plaintiff 
5 Plaintiff's brief goes on to state that Ketterling "should not have merely assumed that a lack of any filing with the 
Secretary of State meant the restaurant was owned by the larger corporation and not a franchisee." Plaintiff's Brief, 
p. 11 (emphasis added). 
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in Ketterling found on the Secretary of State's website that Burger King Corporation had 
registered to do business as "Burger King" in the state of Idaho. There was no information 
demonstrating that HB Boys was the owner/operator of the Burger King restaurant, because HB 
Boys had not filed a certificate of assumed business name. 
In this case, Ms. Gallagher found the same information on the Secretary of State's 
website: that L & L Legacy Limited Partnerships had registered to do business in Idaho as Best 
W estem Cottontree Inn. There was no infonnation demonstrating that Snake River was the 
owner/operator of the Best Western Hotel, because Snake River had not yet filed a certificate of 
assumed business name. The factual distinction asserted by Ms. Gallagher does not exist; Ms. 
Gallagher found the same information on the website as the plaintiff in Ketterling. 
In a further attempt to distinguish her case from Ketterling, Ms. Gallagher asserts 
additional factual distinctions which are completely inaccurate and misstate the facts set forth in 
the Ketterling decision and in the record before this Court. Specifically, Ms. Gallagher's brief 
states the following: 
The Ketterling case is quite different from Gallagher's 
situation. Gallagher had the proper address for the place of injury, 
and found that address listed in the official record on file with the 
Idaho Secretary of State, and that it had been on file with that name 
and address for many years prior to the accident, and was 'current' 
as of the time of filing the complaint. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 11. Ms. Gallagher's statement that she had the proper location of the injury 
elicits an assumption that the plaintiff in Ketterling did not, which is false. In Ketterling, this 
Court distinguished it from Winn by expressly stating "Ketterling is correct that this is not a 
situation in which she 'fail[ ed] to take the simple step of finding out where she fell.' Ketterling 
had the right place, but she still failed to exercise reasonable diligence in figuring out who to 
sue." Ketterling, 152 at 560 (emphasis added). Rather than distinguishing the two cases, this fact 
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illustrates another of that both :t-v1s. Gallagher and Ketterling had the 
proper location 
business. 
their respective accidents, but failed to ascertain the proper owner of the 
Lastly, Ms. Gallagher argues that she "found the address [ of the injury] listed in the 
official record on file with the Idaho Secretary of State, and that it had been on file with that 
name and address for many years." Appellant's Brief, p. 11. This statement is false. As 
illustrated by Ms. Gallagher's own submissions, only the business address of L & L Legacy was 
provided on the Secretary of State's website, not the address of the hotel (the site of the injury). 
There is also no evidence that the address of the hotel had ever been listed, let alone for "many 
years" as asserted by Ms. Gallagher's brief. Ms. Gallagher's assertion is simply not true. (R. pp. 
15-18). Ms. Gallagher also states that L & L Legacy's information was "current." Appellant's 
Brief, p. 11. Clearly, Ketterling presumed the Secretary of State's records were "current" and 
relied upon their accuracy, just as Ms. Gallagher allegedly did. In Ketterling, this Court 
established that while this was a reasonable first step, a plaintiff is responsible for bringing her 
own lawsuit, which entails some minor, yet additional steps to ensure the correct parties are 
included. As such, Ms. Gallagher's attempt to distance herself from the Ketterling case by 
creating factual distinctions where none exist is illusory, and her arguments actually confirm the 
glaring similarities between the two cases. 
In summation, a review of the facts in Ketterling demonstrates that this case and the 
Ketterling case are substantially similar and that the District Court correctly granted Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss based upon the Ketterling decision. The following is a brief highlight of the 
pertinent similarities between this case and the Ketterling case: 
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,n~ohe:r 
-
HB Boys, owner and operator of the Snake River Petersen Properties, LLC, owner and J 
Burley Burger King restaurant, failed to operator of Best Western Cottontree Inn at the time 
file a certificate of assumed business of the subject accident, failed to file a certificate of 
name with the Idaho Secretary of State. assumed business name with the Idaho Secretary 
of State. 
Plaintiff searches the Idaho Secretary of Plaintiff searches the Idaho Secretary of State's 
State's records and finds the records for records and finds the records for L&L Legacy 1 
Burger King Co1:12oration, doing Limited PartnershiQ, doing business as "Best 
business as "Burger King" in Idaho. Western Cottontree" Inn in Idaho. 
Plaintiff contends that she could Plaintiff contends that she could ascertain no name 
ascertain no name besides Burger King besides L&L Legacy Limited PartnershiQ 
Corporation registered with the Idaho registered with the Idaho Secretary of State's 
Secretary of State's Office to conduct Office to conduct business m Idaho as Best 
business in Idaho under the name Western Cottontree Inn. 
"Burger King." 
Plaintiff takes no further action to Plaintiff takes no further action to investigate the 
investigate the identity of the owner identity of the ovvner and/or operator of the Best 
and/or operator of the Burley Burger Western Cottontree Inn in Idaho Falls, and files 
King restaurant, and files suit against suit against L&L Legacy Limited Partnership, 
Burger King Corporation, as registered LLC., as registered with the Idaho Secretary of 
with the Idaho Secretary of State's State's Office. 
Office. 
Plaintiff later learns that the restaurant is Approximately six months after the expiration of 
owned and operated by HB Boys and the statute of limitations, Plaintiff learns that the 
attempts to amend her com12laint and Best Western Cottontree Inn IS owned and 
serve the lawsuit on HB Boys after the operated by Snake River Petersen Properties, LLC, 
ex12iration of the statute of limitations. and amends her Comglaint and serves the 
Defendant nine months after the expiration of the 
statute of limitations. 
As demonstrated above, there are no significant factual distinctions between the 
Ketterling case and our case. Ms. Gallagher's assertion that factual distinctions exist based upon 
the information found on the Secretary of State's website in each case is not supported by the 
record. 
Ultimately, Ms. Gallagher is asking this Court to ignore well-settled case law in an effort 
to benefit plaintiff parties that fail to take diligent steps to ascertain parties' identities and adhere 
to deadlines in a timely manner. Ms. Gallagher has attempted to present a unique case in order to 
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offer this Court an opportunity to expand on the dicta found in Winn. However, this very 
circun1stance was presented to this Court Ketterling v. Burger King Corp. Like HB Boys, 
Snake River engaged no efforts to deceive Ms. Gallagher; it merely failed to file a certificate 
of assumed business name with the Secretary of State following the acquisition of the business. It 
would be inequitable to allow Ms. Gallagher a windfall at the expense of Snake River, when she 
failed to initiate and prosecute her lawsuit in accordance with the plain language of the law. 
Lawsuits are for the benefit of the plaintiff, and as such are commenced and driven forward 
through their efforts. It is incumbent upon a plaintiff to take the reasonable steps necessary to 
find the correct defendant party; in the cases of Winn and Ketterling, the Court outlined what 
those steps are. Finding for Ms. Gallagher in this case and overturning the District Court's 
decision would merely be rewarding Ms. Gallagher for failing to timely prosecute her claim. 
Every deadline given to Ms. Gallagher in this case was pushed to the limit, demonstrating a clear 
lack of diligence on the part of Ms. Gallagher. This lack of due diligence should not be rewarded. 
V. CONCLUSION. 
Based upon the foregoing argument, the District Court was correct in determining that 
Ms. Gallagher's Amended Complaint does not relate back and that the lawsuit should be 
dismissed pursuant to the two-year personal injury statute of limitations. The District Court also 
correctly determined that based upon the clear guidance of Ketterling, the undisputed facts in this 
matter do not support a tolling of the statute of limitations based upon the Snake River's failure 
to file a certificate of assumed business name. Snake River also seeks an award of its attorney 
fees and costs incurred on appeal and asks that this Court render such other and further relief as it 
deems just and proper. 
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this 2016. 
&ELIA, LLP 
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